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This Article analyzes key vulnerabilities in the Internet’s 
infrastructure, protocols, and code, and how they may be better 
managed through interventions at multiple levels.  In particular, 
this Article examines the concept of polycentric governance and its 
applicability to technical vulnerabilities in the Internet.  This 
theory has been championed by proponents such as Nobel 
Laureate Elinor Ostrom and promotes self-organization and 
networking regulations at multiple levels to address an array of 
global issues, from urban crime, to climate change and cyber 
attacks.  However, there has not yet been a consideration of the 
applicability of this framework to technical Internet vulnerabilities 
explicitly, which is a conversation this Article seeks to jumpstart. 
 
‘The Internet was designed without any 
contemplation of national boundaries. The actual 
traffic in the Net is totally unbounded with respect 
to geography.’ Vint[on] Cerf, who uttered those 
words, should know; he helped design the computer 
protocols that made the Internet possible. And yet 
the ‘father of the Internet’ is only partially right. 
Yes, the Internet he designed did not contemplate 
national boundaries. But no . . . the Internet is not 
‘unbound with respect to geography.’ Cerf’s central 
mistake, a mistake typically made about the 
Internet, is to believe that there was something 
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necessary or unchangeable about the Net’s original 
architecture. 
– Harvard Professor Jack Goldsmith and Columbia Professor 
Tim Wu1 
The only truly secure system is one that is powered 
off, cast in a block of concrete and sealed in a lead-
lined room with armed guards—and even then I 
have my doubts. 
– Purdue Professor Gene Spafford2 
INTRODUCTION 
Dr. Charlie Miller says that he can crash the Internet and take 
control of some of the most protected computer systems in the 
world.3  Miller, now a cybersecurity analyst at Twitter,4 was the 
first person to break into Apple’s iPhone; he discovered a software 
flaw that would have allowed him to take control of every iPhone 
on the planet.5  He has won the prestigious Black Hat cybersecurity 
competition, among numerous other awards, and worked for the 
NSA for five years.6  In 2010, while presenting at a NATO 
Committee of Excellence conference on cyber conflict in Tallinn, 
Estonia, Miller conducted a thought experiment—if he was forced 
                                                                                                             
1 JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET?: ILLUSIONS OF A 
BORDERLESS WORLD 58 (2006). 
2 QUOTABLE SPAF, http://spaf.cerias.purdue.edu/quotes.html (last visited Jan. 14, 
2014) (citing A. K. Dewdney, Computer Recreations: Of Worms, Viruses and Core War, 
260 SCI. AM., Mar. 1989, at 110, 110). 
3 See Charlie Miller, Presentation at the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of 
Excellence (CCDCOE) Conference, in Tallinn, Est. (June 17, 2010), available at 
http://ccdcoe.org/conference2010/materials/app.html. 
4 See Andy Greenberg, Twitter Hires Elite Apple Hacker Charlie Miller to Beef up Its 
Security Team, FORBES (Sept. 14, 2012, 10:05 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
andygreenberg/2012/09/14/twitter-snags-elite-apple-hacker-charlie-miller-to-beef-up-its-
security-team. 
5 See Andy Greenberg, How to Hijack ‘Every iPhone in the World’, FORBES (July 28, 
2009, 5:40 PM), http:www.forbes.com20090728hackers-iphone-apple-technology-
security-hackers.html. 
6 See Kelly J. Higgins, Apple ‘Ban’ Gives Miller Time to Hack Other Things, DARK 
READING (July 10, 2012), http://www.darkreading.com/end-user/apple-ban-gives-miller-
time-to-hack-othe/240003490. 
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to, how would he go about crashing the Internet and taking control 
of protected systems?7  In the scenario that he imagined, former 
North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il had kidnapped and induced him 
to “hack the planet”—to control as many protected systems and 
Internet hosts as possible so as to dominate cyberspace.  Miller 
then catalogued all of the steps that would be required to meet this 
audacious goal. 
He would need people—roughly 600 working throughout the 
world, and a way to communicate with them.8  The trick would be 
identifying them—a task made easier if Miller or another expert in 
the field was a willing co-conspirator with a North Korean 
intelligence agency like the Cabinet General Intelligence Bureau.9  
Assuming that he could gather the necessary talent, Table 3.1 
describes how Miller would divide tasks among his “army.” 
 
Table 3.1: Charlie Miller’s Hypothetical Cyber Army10 
 
Job Title Brief Job 
Description 
Approximate 
Number of 
Hackers 
Required 
Total Cost 
(in millions) 
Vulnerability 
analyst 
Find bugs in 
code: need to 
be world-
class 
programmers 
20 $2.9 
Exploit 
developers 
Research and 
exploit 
vulnerabilities 
across a range 
of platforms 
70 $7.3 
                                                                                                             
7 See Miller, supra note 3. 
8 See id. 
9 See North Korean Intelligence Agencies, FAS, https://www.fas.org/irp/world/dprk/
index.html (last visited June 12, 2013). 
10 See Miller, supra note 3. 
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Botnet 
collectors 
Collect hosts 
(i.e., take over 
millions of 
computers) 
60 $4.15 
Botnet 
maintainers 
Monitor size 
and health of 
botnets 
220 $12.9 
Operators Exploit hard 
and soft 
targets 
60 $5.4 
Remote 
personnel 
Set up 
operations 
around the 
world and 
access “air-
gapped 
systems” 
20 $.4 
Developers Develop 
custom 
software, 
including bots 
40 $2.85 
Testers Test exploits 
for 
functionality 
and reliability 
15 $.8 
Technical 
consultants 
Offer 
expertise in 
specific 
systems, like 
SCADA and 
medical 
devices 
20 $2 
System 
administrators 
Keep systems 
running and 
updated 
10 $.5 
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Managers Manage the 
army 
52 $6.2 
 
Miller’s army would need funding and “weapons” like botnets, 
distributed denial of service attacks, bots, and—above all—zero-
day exploits, all of which are described in this Article.  These 
weapons would often use the Internet, but to complete his hack, 
Miller would also need to compromise hard, protected targets that 
are often “air gapped,” or not connected to the Internet.  High-
profile attacks like Stuxnet, the exfiltrated documents published by 
WikiLeaks, and the 2008 breach of classified U.S. government 
systems are examples of these types of attacks.11  Attackers look 
for entry points that are poorly defended with the goal of using one 
host to infect others on the closed network.12  This could be 
accomplished by low-tech means, such as through a simple flash 
drive.13 
Lastly, Miller would need time.  For the first three months, his 
cyber army would search for vulnerabilities.  From three to nine 
months, zero-day exploits would be identified and used to take 
over routers.  After one year, some hard, protected targets would 
be compromised.  At eighteen months, sufficient zero-day exploits 
would be found and air-gapped systems compromised to begin 
final planning.  Finally, after two years, the attack could start 
manifesting itself assuming that no law enforcement agency or 
other group identified the attackers in the meantime, which is a 
rather large assumption. 
                                                                                                             
11 See, e.g., Tom Gjelten, For Recent Cyberattacks, Motivations Vary, NPR (June 16, 
2011, 12:01 AM), http:www.npr.org20110616137210246for-recent-cyberattacks-
motivations-vary (reporting on a subset of cyber attacks and discussing the varying 
motivations of attackers); Protecting SCADA Systems with Air Gaps Is a Myth, INFOSEC 
ISLAND (May 21, 2012), http://www.infosecisland.com/blogview/21388-Protecting-
SCADA-Systems-with-Air-Gaps-is-a-Myth.html (discussing air gapping). 
12 See Miller, supra note 3. 
13 See, e.g., Farhad Manjoo, Don’t Stick It in: The Dangers of USB Drives, SLATE 
(Oct. 5, 2010), http:www.slate.comarticlestechnologytechnology201010dont_stick_
it_in.html. 
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The bottom line, according to Miller, is that the Internet and 
even air-gapped computer systems may be controlled or crashed 
for roughly $50 million, which is reportedly less than what North 
Korea spends on cybersecurity annually.14  Richard Clarke, former 
National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection, and 
Counter-terrorism for the United States, among others, has warned 
that North Korea will not shy away from using its cyber warfare 
capabilities in a conflict.15  This danger is posed by other isolated 
regimes as well, and there is “anecdotal evidence that unknown 
parties have explored the possibility of disrupting the global 
network.”16  Sound ripe for a spy thriller?  What is good for genre-
writing enthusiasts is rarely an ideal starting point for 
policymakers.  According to some commentators, such narratives 
merely serve to inflate fears and undermine constructive efforts to 
enhance cybersecurity,17 and it is true that such a scenario is highly 
unlikely.  But there is some value to be extracted from this tale.  
The vulnerabilities that Miller points to are real and require our 
attention if we are to ensure that fiction does not become reality.  
However, contemporary approaches have not been successful in 
mitigating the cyber threat, raising the need to consider novel 
governance structures. 
This Article fills in the background to Miller’s narrative by 
analyzing the key vulnerabilities in the Internet’s infrastructure, 
protocols, and code, and how they may be better managed through 
interventions at multiple scales.  In particular, this Article 
examines the concept of polycentric governance and its 
applicability to technical vulnerabilities in the Internet.  This multi-
                                                                                                             
14 Miller, supra note 3; see also SEC’Y OF DEF., MILITARY AND SECURITY 
DEVELOPMENTS INVOLVING THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA 9 (2012) (an 
annual report to Congress discussing North Korea’s cyberwarfare capabilities). 
15 See Andy Greenberg, Security Guru Richard Clarke Talks Cyberwar, FORBES (Apr. 
8, 2010, 11:45 AM), http:www.forbes.com20100408cyberwar-obama-korea-
technology-security-clarke.html. 
16 James A. Lewis, The “Korean” Cyber Attacks and Their Implications for Cyber 
Conflict, CSIS 6 n.7 (Oct. 2009), http://csis.org/files/publication/091023_Korean_Cyber_
Attacks_and_Their_Implications_for_Cyber_Conflict.pdf. 
17 See, e.g., Cyberwar: War in the Fifth Domain, ECONOMIST, July 1, 2010, 
http://www.economist.com/node/16478792 (reporting on the unlikelihood of a cyber 
apocalypse) [hereinafter Cyberwar]. 
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level, multi-purpose, multi-type, and multi-sectoral model,18 
championed by scholars including Nobel Laureate Elinor Ostrom 
and Professor Vincent Ostrom, challenges orthodoxy by 
demonstrating the benefits of self-organization, networking 
regulations at multiple levels, and the extent to which national and 
private control can coexist with communal management.19  The 
“basic idea” of polycentric governance is that a group facing a 
collective action problem “should be able to address it” in 
“whatever way they [members of the group] best see fit.”20  This 
could include using existing governance structures or crafting new 
systems.21  This partially bottom-up form of governance is 
consistent with approaches taken by such technical communities as 
the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF),22 and so may have 
some applicability to addressing outstanding vulnerabilities that 
have so far avoided amelioration. 
The Article is structured as follows.  Part I investigates how it 
is possible to regulate through architecture to enhance 
cybersecurity, building from the work of Professors Lawrence 
Lessig and Andrew Murray, as well as other regulatory theorists.23  
                                                                                                             
18 See Michael D. McGinnis, An Introduction to IAD and the Language of the Ostrom 
Workshop: A Simple Guide to a Complex Framework, 39 POL’Y STUD. J. 163 (Feb. 2011) 
(defining “polycentricity” as “a system of governance in which authorities from 
overlapping jurisdictions (or centers of authority) interact to determine the conditions 
under which these authorities, as well as the citizens subject to these jurisdictional units, 
are authorized to act as well as the constraints put upon their activities for public 
purposes”). 
19 See Elinor Ostrom, Polycentric Systems as One Approach for Solving Collective-
Action Problems 2 (Ind. Univ. Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, 
Working Paper Series No. 08–6, 2008). 
20 Michael D. McGinnis, Costs and Challenges of Polycentric Governance: An 
Equilibrium Concept and Examples from U.S. Health Care 1 (The Vincent and Elinor 
Ostrom Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Working 
Paper No. W11-3, 2011) (prepared for presentation at the Conference on Self-
Governance, Polycentricity, and Development, Renmin Univsity, in Beijing, China), 
available at http://php.indiana.edu/~mcginnis/Beijing_core.pdf. 
21 Id. at 1–2. 
22 See generally Scott J. Shackelford, Toward Cyber Peace: Managing Cyber Attacks 
Through Polycentric Governance, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 1273, (2013) (exploring the 
applicability of polycentric governance to Internet governance debates). 
23 See ANDREW W. MURRAY, THE REGULATION OF CYBERSPACE: CONTROL IN THE 
ONLINE ENVIRONMENT 43 (2006). 
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Part II then explores the Internet’s systemic vulnerabilities along 
with how cyber attackers are exploiting them, using case studies 
such as GhostNet.  Finally, in Part III, we address the extent to 
which cybersecurity may be improved through a polycentric 
approach to addressing technical vulnerabilities. 
I. AN INTRODUCTION TO REGULATING CYBERSPACE THROUGH 
POLYCENTRIC GOVERNANCE 
Technology is a critical component of managing vulnerabilities 
in the cyber regulatory environment,24 but implementing fixes and 
enhancing cybersecurity requires an understanding of the multiple 
layers that comprise cyberspace.  Sir Tim Berners-Lee analyzes 
four distinct layers of Internet architecture; the transmission, 
computer, software, and content layers.25  Critically, each layer 
“only uses functions from the layer below, and only exports 
functionality to the layer above.”26  This means that mitigation 
strategies are most efficiently introduced from the bottom-up, 
leading to both opportunities and challenges for regulators and 
illustrating the potential for polycentric governance in this context 
that is especially relevant at a time of Congressional impasse over 
how best to enhance cybersecurity.27 
To help translate these insights into a regulatory framework for 
policymakers, Professor Yochai Benkler has introduced a 
simplified three-layer structure composed of: (1) the “physical 
infrastructure,” including the fiber optic cables and routers making 
up the physical aspect of cyberspace; (2) the “logical 
infrastructure,” comprising necessary “software such as the TCP/IP 
protocol;” and (3) the “content layer,” which includes data and, 
                                                                                                             
24 See id. 
25 See TIM BERNERS-LEE, WEAVING THE WEB: THE ORIGINAL DESIGN AND ULTIMATE 
DESTINY OF THE WORLD WIDE WEB BY ITS INVENTOR 129–30 (2000). 
26 MURRAY, supra note 23, at 43. 
27 See id. at 44–45; see, e.g., Nelson Peacock, Cybersecurity Could Be the Next 
Bipartisan Breakthrough, THE HILL (Jan. 30, 2014), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-
blog/technology/196026-cybersecurity-could-be-the-next-bipartisan-breakthrough 
(discussing the potential of a cybersecurity bill passing Congress in 2014); Alan Charles 
Raul, Break the Impasse on Cybersecurity, THE HILL, (June 12, 2012, 12:05 AM), 
http://thehill.com/opinion/op-ed/232147-break-the-impasse-on-cybersecurity. 
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indirectly, users.28  This model has also been adopted with some 
modifications by Professor Lessig to help explain how code 
regulates content and becomes law,29 and to advocate for 
protecting openness so as to incentivize “decentralized innovation” 
through codifying such architecture in the supporting layers.30  
However, Professor Murray has argued that such an approach is 
“idealistic” and could create conflict, observing that, “the 
harnessing of one regulatory modality through the application of 
another is more likely to lead to further regulatory competition, 
due to the complexity of the network environment.”31  Instead of 
solely relying on code, then, laws, norms, and markets also have 
important roles to play in shaping the polycentric regulatory 
environment.32  Because of its emphasis on targeted measures, 
self-organization, and collaborative bottom-up governance, 
polycentric governance may provide an avenue to better 
understand this regulatory complexity and how it can be harnessed 
to mitigate conflict and enhance cybersecurity. 
Scholars from various disciplines have developed the concept 
of polycentricity, but for the immediate purposes polycentric 
governance may be considered a regulatory system “characterized 
by multiple governing authorities at differing scales rather than a 
monocentric unit,” according to Professor Ostrom.33  Unlike in 
traditional conceptions of governance, then, in which the State 
plays a central role, the State is not the only source of rulemaking 
in a polycentric system and, in fact, may play little or no role at 
                                                                                                             
28 MURRAY, supra note 23, at 44–45 (citing Yochai Benkler, From Consumers to 
Users: Shifting the Deeper Structure of Regulation Toward Sustainable Commons and 
User Access, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 561, 562 (2000)). 
29 See LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND 
THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 160 (2004) (describing 
“the interaction between architecture and law . . . .”). 
30 See LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A 
CONNECTED WORLD 85 (2002); MURRAY, supra note 23, at 46. 
31 MURRAY, supra note 23, at 46 (“It is highly unlikely that content producers, media 
corporations and other copyright holders will allow for a neutral system designed to 
protect cultural property and creativity at the cost of loss of control over their products.”). 
32 See id. at 46–47, 124. 
33 Elinor Ostrom, Polycentric Systems for Coping with Collective Action and Global 
Environmental Change, 20 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 550, 552 (2010). 
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all.34  Rather, an array of interdependent public and private-sector 
stakeholders interact, each adding some value to the overall 
regime.35  There is an opportunity within such a system for 
“mutual monitoring, learning, and adaptation of better strategies 
over time.”36 
Perhaps no one has done more to advance the study of 
polycentric governance than Nobel laureate Elinor Ostrom, 
Vincent Ostrom, and their colleagues at the Vincent and Elinor 
Ostrom Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis at 
Indiana University.37  Beginning in the 1970s, their work in this 
space challenged prevailing notions regarding the benefits of 
consolidating public services, like police and education.38  Through 
a series of studies, they demonstrated, for example, that small- and 
medium-sized police departments outperformed their larger 
counterparts.39  Though much of this early work arose in the 
context of small-scale common pool resources, toward the end of 
her career Professor Ostrom and others began arguing for the 
adoption of polycentric solutions to collective action problems 
stemming from global common pool resources; such work 
arguably has some application to the Internet.  Yet in order to 
conceptualize such a dynamic environment operating at multiple 
scales, it is first necessary to analyze the Internet’s architecture and 
                                                                                                             
34 See Julie Black, Constructing and Contesting Legitimacy and Accountability in 
Polycentric Regulatory Regimes, 2 REG. & GOVERNANCE 137, 137–38 (2008). 
35 See Vincent Ostrom, Charles M. Tiebout, & Robert Warren, The Organization of 
Government in Metropolitan Areas: A Theoretical Inquiry, 55 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 831, 
831–32 (1961). 
36 Ostrom, supra note 33, at 552. 
37 See VINCENT & ELINOR OSTROM WORKSHOP IN POL. THEORY & POL’Y ANALYSIS, 
http://www.indiana.edu/~workshop (last visited June 1, 2013). 
38 See, e.g., ELINOR OSTROM ET AL., PATTERNS OF METROPOLITAN POLICING (1978) 
(reporting on a major study of police organization in 80 metropolitan areas); Eric A. 
Hanushek, The Economics of Schooling: Production and Efficiency in Public Schools, 24 
J. ECON. LIT. 1141 (1986) (finding no better performance in larger school districts); Paul 
Teske et al., Establishing the Micro Foundations of a Macro Theory: Information, 
Movers, and the Competitive Local Market for Public Goods, 87 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 702 
(1993). 
39 See generally POLYCENTRICITY AND LOCAL PUBLIC ECONOMIES: READINGS FROM THE 
WORKSHOP IN POLITICAL THEORY AND POLICY ANALYSIS (Michael D. McGinnis, ed. 
1999) (collecting these studies). 
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efforts to make it more secure at all levels, which is a task we turn 
to in Part II. 
II. MITIGATING VULNERABILITIES IN NETWORK ARCHITECTURE 
AND CODE TO ENHANCE CYBERSECURITY FROM THE BOTTOM UP 
This Part builds from the conceptual framework introduced in 
Part I to discuss how polycentric governance may be applied to 
analyze a range of technical Internet vulnerabilities from the 
bottom up.  This investigation thus begins with hardware, before 
moving on to assess vulnerabilities in the logical infrastructure, 
code, and user best practices focusing on mitigating social 
engineering attacks. 
A. Securing the Internet’s Physical Infrastructure 
At its most basic level, the Internet is composed of a series of 
cables, computers, and routers.40  Innocent or malicious hardware 
flaws in this physical infrastructure can give rise to myriad 
vulnerabilities.  As Clarke and Robert Knake explain, “[w]hat can 
be done to millions of lines of code can also be done with millions 
of circuits imprinted on computer chips inside computers, routers, 
and servers.”41  Circuits leave physical trapdoors, but as with code, 
most experts cannot easily identify flaws in a computer chip.42  
Indeed, producing a microchip requires some 400 steps.43  Aside 
from manufacturing or design defects, some bugs may be 
purposefully implanted.  A 2012 Microsoft report found malware 
being installed in PCs at factories in China, highlighting the 
insecurity of production lines.44  U.S. government reports have also 
cited supply chain concerns for hardware, finding components 
                                                                                                             
40 See MURRAY, supra note 23, at 44. 
41 RICHARD A. CLARKE & ROBERT K. KNAKE, CYBER WAR: THE NEXT THREAT TO 
NATIONAL SECURITY AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 95 (2010). 
42 See id. 
43 See Wesley K. Clark & Peter L. Levin, Securing the Information Highway, FOREIGN 
AFF. (Nov. 2009), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65499/wesley-k-clark-and-
peter-l-levin/securing-the-information-highway. 
44 See Malware Inserted on PC Production Lines, Says Study, BBC (Sept. 13, 2012, 
10:51 AM), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-19585433. 
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embedded with security flaws.45  In a worst-case scenario, kill 
switches could be installed in Pentagon networks to power down 
critical systems by remote control as a prelude to an attack.  Yet 
revelations from Edward Snowden have revealed that the NSA has 
also been intercepting computer shipments to install backdoors in 
hardware and even spy on Microsoft’s internal communications 
system.46 
The U.S. Department of Defense’s (DOD) commercial-off-the-
shelf (COTS) program was intended to help drive down costs for 
proven technologies by using state-of-the-art commercial systems 
in lieu of the cost-plus-award-fee method that covered contractors’ 
costs and paid them a profit.47  The advantages of COTS are self-
evident, but with a COTS item—such as Dell computer hardware, 
which is widely used by the Department of Defense—the 
government cannot monitor the manufacturing process.48  Thus, 
the true cost of COTS lies in the vulnerabilities that it introduces 
into critical national infrastructure.49  Grasping how to best contain 
the issue of hardware flaws is difficult because the supply chain 
involves many companies operating in many countries.  According 
to some experts like Clarke, buying hardware that has been 
manufactured abroad leaves U.S. systems vulnerable to attacks.50  
                                                                                                             
45 See CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 41, at 95; Aliya Sternstein, Threat of Destructive 
Coding on Foreign-Manufactured Technology Is Real, NEXTGOV (July 7, 2011), 
http://www.nextgov.com/cybersecurity/2011/07/threat-of-destructive-coding-on-foreign-
manufactured-technology-is-real/49363. 
46 See, e.g., Raphael Satter, Report: NSA Intercepts Computer Deliveries, AP (Dec. 29, 
2013), http://hosted.ap.org/dynamic/stories/E/EU_NSA_SURVEILLANCE?SITE=AP&
SECTION=HOME&TEMPLATE=DEFAULT. 
47 See, e.g., Press Release, Frost & Sullivan, U.S. Department of Defense to 
Increasingly Rely on Commercial Off-the-Shelf Aircraft (June 6, 2013), available at 
http://www.frost.com/prod/servlet/press-release.pag?docid=279378546 (reporting on 
spending increases on the DOD’s COTS aircraft purchase program). 
48 See CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 41, at 86 (discussing the production process of a 
Dell laptop). 
49 See also Elizabeth Montalbano, DOD Approves Dell Android Tablet for Use, INFO. 
WK. (Oct. 31, 2011, 4:06 PM), http://www.informationweek.com/government/ 
mobile/dod-approves-dell-android-tablet-for-use/231901988 (reporting on an example of 
DOD purchases of Dell products). 
50 See Adrian Kingsley-Hughes, Hardware Imported from China Could Leave U.S. 
Open to Cyber-Threats, ZDNET (Mar. 30, 2012, 6:13 GMT), http:www.zdnet.com
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However, there are not enough U.S. manufacturers to allow the 
Pentagon to buy domestically, as shown by the DOD’s purchase of 
2,200 Sony PlayStation 3s in 2009 to provide processing power for 
a military supercomputer.51  These systems are often manufactured 
abroad in nations including China that have track records of supply 
chain insecurity.52  Once compromised, hardware is often in the 
hands of an unknowing user.  Few hardware vulnerabilities are 
likely to be discovered and fixed—and even fewer are likely to be 
attributed to a particular cyber attacker. 
More can be done to secure the Internet’s physical 
infrastructure.  New add-on security features are needed to 
safeguard systems,53 as are quality control and, in the U.S. context, 
more domestic sources of key components.  The DOD, for 
example, could revise COTS and make a long-standing 
commitment to U.S. firms to purchase critical components 
domestically.  This would have the dual benefits of being both a 
boon to the U.S. electronics industry by creating good U.S. jobs as 
well as promoting cybersecurity.  Though not a perfect solution 
since domestically produced hardware may still be vulnerable to 
insider attacks,54 and such protectionism would need to be 
targeted, transparent, and justifiable to assuage concerns over 
                                                                                                             
bloghardwarehardware-imported-from-china-could-leave-us-open-to-cyber-
threats19400. 
51 See Military Purchases 2,200 PS3s, CNN (Dec. 9, 2009, 11:14 AM), 
http:scitech.blogs.cnn.com200912 09military-purchases-2200-ps3s. 
52 See WHITE HOUSE, CYBERSPACE POLICY REVIEW: ASSURING A TRUSTED AND 
RESILIENT INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE 34 (2009) [hereinafter 
CYBERSPACE POLICY REVIEW] (noting that “the emergence of new centers for 
manufacturing, design, and research across the globe raises concerns about the potential 
for easier subversion of computers and networks through subtle hardware or software 
manipulations”); Sony to Manufacture PS3 in China to Ensure Supply (SNE), SEEKING 
ALPHA (May 16, 2006, 11:00 AM) http:seekingalpha.comarticle10729-sony-to-
manufacture-ps3-in-china-to-ensure-supply-sne. 
53 See COMM. NAT’L SEC. SYS., NATIONAL INFORMATION ASSURANCE (IA) GLOSSARY 2 
(Apr. 26, 2010), available at http://www.ncix.gov/publications/policy/docs/CNSSI_ 
4009.pdf. 
54 See CYBERSPACE POLICY REVIEW, supra note 52, at 34 (“Foreign manufacturing 
does present easier opportunities for nation-state adversaries to subvert products; 
however, the same goals could be achieved through the recruitment of key insiders or 
other espionage activities.”). 
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touching off a trade war,55 it would be an improvement on the 
status quo.  Securing the physical layer, though, is merely the first 
step toward enhancing cybersecurity and ultimately fostering cyber 
peace. 
B. Managing Vulnerabilities in the Logical Infrastructure 
Security has not scaled along with the expanding Internet.  
Early networks such as ARPANET, used by a relatively small 
population of engineers and academics, had little need for built-in 
security.  Cybersecurity concerns grew as the Internet evolved, but 
technologies that brought interoperability and efficiency were 
favored over better security, which could slow systems down or 
make them incompatible.  As a result, many potential measures 
that could enhance cybersecurity became mired in debate.56  In 
particular, there are four protocols that represent key aspects of the 
Internet’s architecture and present significant vulnerabilities in the 
logical infrastructure: the Transport Control Protocol (TCP), the 
Internet Protocol (IP), the Domain Name System (DNS) protocol, 
and the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP).  TCP/IP is the set of 
protocols that Robert Kahn and Vinton Cerf designed, easing 
interconnection and laying the groundwork for the Internet.57  DNS 
is the Internet’s address system, designed by Postel and others, that 
works as a phone book to map domain names to IP addresses.  
BGP tells routers how and where to send information and is the 
protocol that enables distributed routing.  Each of these protocols 
and their vulnerabilities are addressed in turn, along with efforts to 
make them more secure within a polycentric framework. 
1. TCP/IP 
Together, TCP and IP describe how the Internet transmits 
packets of data from one place to another by addressing, 
                                                                                                             
55 See id.; Allan A. Friedman, Cybersecurity and Trade: National Policies, Global and 
Local Consequences, BROOKINGS INST., 4–5 (2013), http://www.brookings.edu/~/
media/research/files/papers/2013/09/19%20cybersecurity%20and%20trade%20global%2
0local%20friedman/brookingscybersecuritynew.pdf. 
56 See ROBERT K. KNAKE, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL., INTERNET GOVERNANCE IN AN 
AGE OF CYBER INSECURITY vii (2010). 
57 See MURRAY, supra note 23, at 67–68. 
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fragmenting, and reassembling packets between two reliable 
hosts58—not completely unlike the transporters on Star Trek.  IP, 
however, is an unreliable, “best effort” protocol, meaning that 
packets are not inherently secure.59  There is no easy way to verify 
who sent an IP packet, determine whether it has been modified, or 
even if anyone has viewed it en route.  It is the job of TCP to add 
reliability by monitoring the delivery of IP packets.60  As the layer 
of the Internet Protocol Suite situated between the Internet layer 
and the applications layer, TCP acts as a go-between.  It turns 
fragmented data into a coherent stream.  Many applications, like 
the web and e-mail, use TCP because of its reliability. 
Although TCP provides some protection against packets going 
astray, it was never intended to provide security against a 
malicious adversary modifying or inserting packets into 
communications between two parties.61  For example, before data 
can be transferred between two hosts, TCP must first establish a 
connection between them through a process that is often referred to 
as a “three-way handshake,” akin to the exchange of “hellos” to 
start a telephone conversation.62  These “hello” messages in 
technical parlance are called SYN messages, or synchronized 
packets.  A malicious attacker posing as a client can use a “SYN 
flood” by falsifying or omitting information to make a server never 
complete its part of the handshake.63  It is like tying up a 
switchboard with incoming callers who refuse to hang up. 
                                                                                                             
58 See generally INFO. SCIS. INST., S. CAL., INTERNET PROTOCOL: DARPA INTERNET 
PROGRAM PROTOCOL SPECIFICATION (Jon Postel ed., 1981), available at 
http:tools.ietf.orghtmlrfc791. 
59 See id.; see also TCP/IP Core Protocols, MICROSOFT TECHNET, http://technet.
microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc958827.aspx (last visited June 12, 2013). 
60 INFO. SCIS. INST., S. CAL., TRANSMISSION CONTROL PROTOCOL: DARPA INTERNET 
PROGRAM PROTOCOL SPECIFICATION, RFC 793 (Jon Postel ed., 1981), available at 
http:tools.ietf.orghtmlrfc793. 
61 See Security Threats, MICROSOFT TECHNET, http://technet.microsoft.com/en-
us/library/cc723507.aspx (last visited June 12, 2013) [hereinafter Security Threats] 
(providing an overview of cybersecurity threats including those targeting TCP). 
62 See Randall Stewart & Chris Metz, SCTP: New Transport Protocol for TCPIP, 5(6) 
IEEE INTERNET COMPUTING 64, 67 (2001). 
63 See id.; Wesley Eddy, TCP SYN Flooding Attacks and Common Mitigations, IETF 
RFC 4987 (2007), available at http:tools.ietf.orghtmlrfc4987.  For further discussion 
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As with IP, TCP was recognized by the mid-1990s as 
insecure.64  Extra security was introduced into the three-way 
handshake, such as the IETF randomizing certain information to 
guard against sequence number spoofing.65  Although this limited 
attacks against TCP, it has not eliminated all vulnerabilities.  In 
part, TCP remains vulnerable because IP is vulnerable—by 
hijacking IP packets, an attacker can eavesdrop on a TCP session, 
record the sequence of numbers being used, and forge a set of false 
IP packets that trick TCP.66  This allows for spying, a starting point 
for cyber-espionage and crime. 
2. DNS 
In August 2013, the New York Times online operations, along 
with an array of other organizations such as Twitter, were hacked, 
allegedly by the Syrian Electronic Army.67  These and other sites 
have been compromised as a result of insecurities in the DNS, 
allowing attackers to, for example, “limit access” to the New York 
Times website “for nearly 48 hours.”68  In this case, attackers 
hacked into an Australian domain name registry and managed to 
alter stored information there, allowing them to redirect users to a 
webpage sporting whatever information the Syrian Electronic 
Army wished to post.69 
Unfortunately, such attacks are far from the exception since, 
like IP and TCP, DNS was recognized as being insecure in the 
                                                                                                             
of the types of SYN Floods, see Hossein Falaki et al., A First Look at Traffic on 
Smartphones, IMC INTERNET MEASUREMENT CONFERENCE PROC. 281, 285 (2010). 
64 See Chris Chambers, Justin Dolske & Jayaraman Iyer, TCPIP Security, DEP’T 
COMP. SCI. OHIO ST. U., http://www.linuxsecurity.com/resource_files/documentation/
tcpip-security.html (last visited June 12, 2013). 
65 See STEVEN M. BELLOVIN, DEFENDING AGAINST SEQUENCE NUMBER ATTACKS, IETF 
RFC 1948 (1996), available at http:tools.ietf.orghtmlrfc1948. 
66 See Security Threats, supra note 61. 
67 See Hayley Tsukayama & Timothy B. Lee, How the Syrian Electronic Army and 
Other Hacker Groups Are Attacking News Web Sites, WASH. POST, Aug. 28, 2013, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/how-the-syrian-electronic-army-and-
other-hacker-groups-are-attacking-news-web-sites/2013/08/28/bda8f464-1032-11e3-
8cdd-bcdc09410972_story.html?wpmk=MK0000200. 
68 See id. 
69 See id. 
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mid-1990s, but fixes stalled.70  Then, in 2008, hacker Dan 
Kaminsky found a bug that demonstrated the full extent of the 
DNS Protocol’s vulnerability,71 in essence demonstrating the 
concept years before the Syrian Electronic Army’s attacks.  Thus, 
the process of matching a domain name to its correct IP address—
the main job of the DNS protocol—was unreliable and insecure.72  
This is because the DNS, like many other protocols, was designed 
to work despite accidental failures, not malicious attacks.  
According to Von Welch, deputy director of the Indiana University 
Center for Applied Cybersecurity Research, “[w]hat we’ve been 
seeing is the slow hardening of the protocols to try and turn their 
failure protections into attack protections.”73 
To take advantage of Kaminsky’s bug, an attacker would likely 
plant fake web pages that are extensions of the same domain.  
Then, when users click on links with the same authority record, 
their browsers would ask a resolver which web page to display by 
using different codes.  If an attacker constantly sends answers to all 
of the users’ resolvers with the help of a bot, he or she will 
eventually guess the right code.  The recursive DNS server will 
then think that the response was from an authoritative DNS server, 
and the response will be accepted.  Because the wrong answer will 
be stored in that resolver’s cache, everyone using the poisoned ISP 
is at risk until the specified time expires.  In 2009, a Brazilian bank 
reported that its ISP was poisoned and “that some of its customers 
were redirected to websites” that were designed “to steal their 
passwords[.]”74  Linux Journal blogger Cory Wright wrote of 
Kaminsky’s bug: “Yes, the exploit is real, and it is severe.”  He 
                                                                                                             
70 See Chambers, supra note 64. 
71 See, e.g., Cory Wright, Understanding Kaminsky’s DNS Bug, LINUX J. (July 25, 
2008), http:www.linuxjournal.comcontentunderstanding-kaminskys-dns-bug (detailing 
the Kaminsky bug). 
72 See id. 
73 Electronic Interview with Von Welch, Deputy Director, Indiana University Center 
for Applied Cybersecurity Research (Sept. 23, 2011). 
74 See Bill Snyder, What You Missed: A Major Internet Security Hole Was Finally 
Plugged, INFOWORLD (Dec. 31, 2010), http://www.infoworld.com/t/authentication-and-
authorization/what-you-missed-major-internet-security-hole-was-finally-plugged-896. 
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also suggested it “may be the biggest DNS security issue in the 
history of the Internet . . . .”75 
3. BGP 
The Border Gateway Protocol is the core routing protocol of all 
of the networks that comprise the Internet.76  Like the other 
protocols discussed in this section, it is charged with a fundamental 
task—telling information how to move.  When an e-mail, for 
example, is sent from one network to another, it passes through 
routers.  When a router receives an IP packet, BGP uses an 
algorithm to make decisions about where to route it next.77  BGP 
keeps routers up-to-date with information they need to receive and 
correctly transmit traffic.78  As such, it is important that the 
information BGP provides is accurate and reliable.  However, like 
IP, BGP offers insufficient ways to confirm accuracy.  Rather, sets 
of routers under a single administration, which are known as 
“autonomous systems,” trade data that is taken at face value 
enabling fast and scaled growth but less control.79  There were 
more than 25,000 registered autonomous systems comprising the 
Internet as of 2007,80 but BGP does not have an authentication 
mechanism to ensure that updates really are from where they 
purport to be.81  It does not have anything equivalent to a recursive 
DNS server’s code to double-check.  BGP simply trusts the 
updates, which has earned it the euphemism “routing by rumor.”82  
                                                                                                             
75 Wright, supra note 71. 
76 See Y. Rekhter et al., A Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4), IETF RFC 4271, 
(2006), available at http:www.ietf.orgrfcrfc4271. 
77 RICK KUHN, KOTIKALAPUDI SRIRAM & DOUG MONTGOMERY, NAT’L INST. 
STANDARDS & TECH., BORDER GATEWAY PROTOCOL SECURITY 1-1, 2-3-1 (2007), 
available at http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-54/SP800-54.pdf. 
78 See id. at 2-1. 
79 See Fariba Khan & Carl A. Gunter, Tiered Incentives for Integrity Based Queuing, 
2010 PROC. WORKSHOP ECON. NETWORKS, SYSTEMS, & COMPUTATION 1, 1 (2010), 
available at http://netecon.seas.harvard.edu/NetEcon10/Papers/Khan10.pdf. 
80 See id. at 6. 
81 See KUHN, SRIRAM & MONTGOMERY, supra note 77, at 3–1. 
82 JAMES MACFARLANE, NETWORK ROUTING BASICS: UNDERSTANDING IP ROUTING IN 
CISCO SYSTEMS 109 (2006); H. Shokrzadeh et al., Improving Directional Rumor Routing 
in Wireless Sensor Networks, IEEE INT’L CONF. 1, 1 (2007).  There are six types or 
principles of security that enable users to have increasing “trust” in their hardware and 
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More and more, however, this trust is being broken as “Internet 
disruptions due to corrupt or improperly formatted or assigned 
BGP announcements are becoming more prevalent.”83  In 2004, 
thousands of U.S. networks “were misdirected to Turkey;” in 2005, 
“AT&T, XO and Bell South networks were misdirected to 
Bolivia;” and in 2007, “Yahoo was unreachable for an hour due to 
a routing problem.”84  Some of these incidents may have been 
accidental, but likely not all.  For example, in 2008, Pakistan 
Telecom purportedly “hijacked all traffic aimed at YouTube[,]” 
taking the website offline for several hours.85  In 2010, a Chinese 
state-controlled telecommunications company commandeered 
fifteen percent of the Internet’s routers, intercepting data from the 
U.S. military for eighteen minutes without anyone seeming to 
notice the service disruption.86  Dmitri Alperovitch, vice president 
of threat research at the anti-virus firm McAfee, said that the 
incident represented “one of the biggest—if not the biggest 
hijacks—we have ever seen” while noting that “it could happen 
again, anywhere and anytime.”87 
                                                                                                             
software, including: confidentiality, integrity, availability, consistency, control, and audit. 
See SIMSON GARFINKEL ET AL., PRACTICAL UNIX AND INTERNET SEC. 33–35 (3d ed. 2003) 
(noting that often, security professionals “use the word trust to describe their level of 
confidence that a computer system will behave as expected”).  Confidentiality, like 
privacy, means “[p]rotecting information from being read or copied by anyone who has 
not been authorized by the owner of that information,” whereas integrity signifies 
protecting information from being altered or deleted without authorization. Id. at 33.  
Availability involves protecting services from being degraded. Id.  Consistency signifies 
ensuring that a system behaves as expected, control involves “[r]egulating access,” and 
audit means system owners have “record[s] of activity” that allow them to trace mistakes 
or malicious acts. Id. at 33–34.  Vulnerabilities lie in these principles’ non-achievement, 
stemming from problems with Internet Protocols to flaws in code and the bad practices of 
users. 
83 Derek Gabbard, Do Recent BGP Anomalies Shed a Light on What’s to Come?, SEC. 
WK. (Sept. 29, 2010), http:www.securityweek.comdo-recent-bgp-anomalies-shed-light-
whats-come. 
84 Ram Mohan, Routing on the Internet: A Disaster Waiting to Happen?, SEC. WK. 
(Dec. 1, 2010), http:www.securityweek.comrouting-internet-disaster-waiting-happen. 
85 See id. 
86 See Stew Magnuson, Cyber Experts Have Proof That China Has Hijacked U.S.-
based Internet Traffic, NAT’L DEF. MAG., Nov. 12, 2010, http://www.
nationaldefensemagazine.org/blog/Lists/Posts/Post.aspx?ID=249. 
87 Id. 
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“BGP eavesdropping” is a threat that “has long been 
considered a theoretical weakness” by intelligence agencies such 
as the NSA, which has reportedly been given private 
demonstrations of the capability.88  Besides disruptive hijacking 
and imperceptible eavesdropping, however, the BGP vulnerability 
also enables many other exploits, including “network 
overloading,” which reduces the bandwidth available for other 
traffic, “black holes,” which involves sending traffic to routers that 
“drop some or all” IP packets, and “looping,” wherein IP packets 
“enter a looping path” and are never delivered but use up 
bandwidth.89  In short, the BGP is the most scalable of all routing 
protocols, but it is also at the “greatest risk of being the target of 
attacks designed to disrupt or degrade service on a large scale.”90  
The question then becomes, how can we better manage this and 
other protocol vulnerabilities within a polycentric framework? 
C. Protocol Fixes 
Efforts aimed at securing vulnerabilities in IP, TCP, DNS, and 
BGP are ongoing, as are debates about the Internet’s design and 
how security might be enhanced.  One major issue is over where 
defenses should be focused—throughout the system or at the 
“endpoints” (that is, applications closest to the user).  Some think 
that IP, TCP, DNS, and BGP need to be significantly altered so 
that security is brought in at a fundamental level.91  Others, 
however, think that this kind of security would change the nature 
of the Internet too much by undermining anonymity or be 
impossible to achieve, preferring instead that security be built into 
applications like the web or e-mail.92  Currently, efforts in both 
                                                                                                             
88 See Kim Zetter, Revealed: The Internet’s Biggest Security Hole, WIRED, Aug. 26, 
2008, http:www.wired.comthreatlevel200808revealed-the-in. 
89 See KUHN, SRIRAM, & MONTGOMERY, supra note 77, at 3–2. 
90 U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SEC., THE NATIONAL STRATEGY TO SECURE CYBERSPACE 30 
(2003). 
91 See, e.g., Tyson Macaulay, Upstream Intelligence: A New Layer of Cybersecurity, 
13 IA NEWSLETTER 22, 23 (2010) (Def. Technical Info. Ctr., U.S. Dep’t of Def.) 
(discussing a layered cybersecurity approach designed to better manage protocol 
vulnerabilities). 
92 See, e.g., Clyde Wayne Crews, Jr., Cybersecurity and Authentication: The 
Marketplace Role in Rethinking Anonymity—Before Regulators Intervene, 20 
402 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 24:381 
 
veins are being undertaken.  For example, IETF editors have 
written Internet Protocol Security (IPsec), which intends to 
improve integrity, confidentiality, and control by providing 
“interoperable, high quality, cryptographically-based” security at 
the IP layer.93  IPsec is available for IPv4 and was originally made 
mandatory by the IETF on all standards-compliant IPv6 networks, 
but its “actual use . . . is optional.”94  For DNS, a Domain Name 
Security Extensions (DNSSEC) protocol, which was proposed by 
IETF in 1997 and revised in 2005, has been receiving attention 
since Kaminsky’s 2008 bug.95  Nevertheless, implementation has 
been haphazard, and skepticism remains about whether these 
solutions actually resolve security problems. 
1. IPsec 
Despite IPsec’s deployment on all major operating systems, it 
is still not widely used.96  Why?  Part of the problem lies in market 
reluctance to bear the cost of enhancing security such as by 
encrypting traffic.  Moreover, IPv6 has not been universally 
deployed as of 2013 and IPsec is only an optional extension on 
IPv497—it is still “not the first choice for many security needs.”98  
Instead, application-level solutions such as Secure Sockets Layer 
(SSL), Transport Layer Security (TLS), and Secure Shell (SSH) 
are sometimes favored as they are easier to deploy.99  Instead of 
changing how IP-addressed packets will act on the Internet, 
                                                                                                             
KNOWLEDGE TECH. & POL’Y 97, 97–98 (2007) (“Over the coming tumultuous period of 
dealing with online threats, policymakers should allow the experimentation necessary to 
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93 S. Kent & K. Seo, Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol, IETF RFC 4301 
(2005), available at http:tools.ietf.orghtmlrfc4301. 
94 IPv6 Security Brief, CISCO, 1 (2011), http://www.cisco.com/en/US/prod/collateral/
iosswrel/ps6537/ps6553/white_paper_c11-678658.pdf; see Kent & Seo, supra note 93. 
95 See D. Eastlake, Domain Name System Security Extensions, IETF RFC 2535 (1999), 
available at http:www.ietf.orgrfcrfc2535. 
96 See Electronic Interview with Yaron Sheffer, Chief Technology Officer, Porticor 
Cloud Security (Jan. 23, 2011). 
97 See J. Loughney, IPV6 Node Requirements, IETF RFC 4294 (2006), available at 
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98 Sheffer, supra note 96. 
99 See B. Briscoe, Tunneling of Explicit Congestion Notification, IETF RFC 6040 
(2010), available at http:tools.ietf.orghtmlrfc6040. 
2014] HACKING THE PLANET, THE DALAI LAMA, AND YOU 403 
 
SSL/TLS and SSH create secure channels of communication that 
act like private networks built on top of the Internet.100  SSH, for 
example, forms a secure shell around data transferred between two 
particular IP addresses across the open Internet.101  Remote users 
and servers are identified at each end of the shell, allowing 
encrypted messages to be sent and received.102  Similarly, 
SSL/TLS uses identification, authentication, and encryption to 
engender confidentiality and control, enabling it to transmit private 
information between particular IP addresses on top of the open 
Internet.103  To do so, SSL/TLS identifies and “authenticates 
clients” and servers and then encrypts messages sent between 
them, such as to create a secure Virtual Private Network (VPN).104  
Because it can protect messages sent between websites and their 
own servers, SSL/TLS is also often associated with more secure 
web browsing, or Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS) 
rather than Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP).105  By providing 
clients with a trustworthy channel by which to communicate, 
SSL/TLS enables consumers to shop, bank, and otherwise take 
risks online, although even this technology has been compromised; 
in 2011, for example, hackers stole credentials, allowing them to 
spy on 300,000 Google mail accounts.106 
HTTPS also presents certain security problems that help 
illustrate the drawbacks of SSL/TLS, including the fact that 
SSL/TLS certificate authorities, which are third parties that 
companies and website owners use to implement encryption, are 
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104 See id. 
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sometimes not themselves trustworthy.107  Companies like Google 
or Facebook implicitly trust these certificate authorities even 
though they can lie about users’ identities or be hacked, resulting 
in an attacker obtaining false certificates.108  For example, in early 
2011, nearly 200 different certificate authorities fulfilled Mozilla 
policies and thus could be used to find websites on Firefox, 
including the China Internet Network Information Center 
(CNNIC), which is run by the Chinese government.109  In mid-
2011, fraudulent certificates were obtained from the servers of 
Comodo, a popular certificate authority that creates certificates for 
the likes of Google mail and Yahoo! Mail, allegedly by an Iranian 
hacker.110  These episodes help demonstrate that although 
SSL/TLS has been effective in creating valuable channels of trust 
on the Internet, this fix cannot compare with IPsec given that SSH 
and SSL/TLS operate at the application layer of the IP, whereas 
IPsec works below the application layer and secures everything 
built on top of the network from the bottom-up.  An analogy is 
going to each parking lot in the United States and installing an 
anti-theft system on every car versus requiring the factory to do so.  
Both options have the same effect, but the latter can be far more 
efficient. 
Nevertheless, IPsec is not a magic bullet.  According to Yaron 
Sheffer—co-chair of IP Security Maintenance and Extensions at 
the IETF—the success of IPsec has been mixed.111  Moreover, new 
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standards, such as those involving deep packet inspection, could 
also undermine the viability of IPsec as a security tool.112  Those in 
favor of more endpoint-based security might argue that resources 
would be better spent on implementing HTTPS and other 
application-level improvements to IP.  However, this could still be 
a second-best solution to a bottom-up fix such as IPsec, although 
opinions are mixed.  The roll out of IPv6 will help speed uptake of 
IPsec, but more must be done to incentivize and enhance IPsec as 
well as application-level security technologies to better manage 
vulnerabilities.  IPv6, for example, boasts strong encryption, but 
also makes it easier for third parties to use traffic analysis to 
determine “who is communicating with whom.”113  Although 
online communities and standards bodies such as the IETF play an 
important role in developing technical fixes for vulnerabilities, 
speeding uptake requires market-based incentives and potentially 
regulation.114 
2. DNSSEC 
Like IPsec, DNSSEC is complex, and opinions about its 
importance and effectiveness vary.  By the early 2000s, it became 
clear that DNSSEC would not scale for large networks like the 
Internet.  Then in 2005, IETF updated the DNSSEC protocol and 
Sweden became the first country-code top-level domain (TLD) to 
deploy it.115  However, like IPsec, no organization mandated that 
DNSSEC be implemented, and few large domain name registries 
did so.  Privacy concerns arose along with a lack of confidence in 
DNSSEC generally.116  As Paul Vixie, president of Internet 
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Systems Consortium, wrote in 2008, “[i]t’s been thirteen years 
since the first DNSSEC mailing list was set up and about four 
times in those thirteen years IETF has declared victory only to 
discover that the stuff didn’t work well outside the lab.”117  Classic 
collective action problems have also emerged that slowed 
deployment because DNSSEC works best if it is supported 
throughout the DNS hierarchy as well as the application layer.118  
Confusion about deploying DNSSEC at the root added another 
disincentive. 
Kaminsky’s bug discovery wrenched DNSSEC out of its 
malaise.  Upon learning about the vulnerability from Kaminsky, 
Microsoft, Cisco Systems, Sun Microsystems, and BIND 
coordinated efforts and simultaneously released a security patch in 
July 2008.119  The patch did not fix the problem overnight, but it 
did begin the process of effectively addressing the problem.  
However, progress remains slow on DNSSEC writ large.  Pre-2008 
implementation problems have not disappeared, and adoption of 
DNSSEC remains imperfect.  It was deployed in the root zone in 
July 2010 and has now been implemented in the dot-gov, dot-net, 
dot-edu, dot-org, and dot-com domains.120  Yet few organizations 
have deployed DNSSEC,121 which is in part because of the fact 
that industry is not used to investing resources in the DNS.  In the 
past, it had been considered a “highly resilient” system.122  
DNSSEC adds complexity and costs, at least at the outset.  
Moreover, not all security professionals have confidence that 
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DNSSEC will solve DNS problems without creating new issues;123 
at best, it would fix a narrow problem around which attackers can 
navigate.  And there is yet another collective action problem to 
consider.  If ISPs and similar infrastructure players adopt DNSSEC 
but others do not and DNS requests stop resolving, end users may 
get frustrated and take their business elsewhere.124  Thus, 
uncertainty abounds—both about the quality of DNSSEC itself and 
the feasibility of deploying it at all levels absent regulatory 
intervention. 
3. Fixing TCP and BGP 
In contrast to the confusion surrounding security for IP and 
DNS, security for TCP and BGP remains somewhat ad hoc.  For 
TCP, some effective countermeasures have been developed, 
although there are trade-offs.  For example, IP packet filtering 
disallows IP address spoofing and serves as a counter to SYN 
floods, but universal deployment is unlikely.125  Alternatively, 
SYN cache and SYN cookies have been described as among the 
best ways to defend against SYN floods,126 but these methods may 
undermine broader network performance.127  For BGP, however, 
there are few effective solutions.  Several alternative BGP 
protocols have been proposed, but it has not yet been resolved 
which, if any, of these protocols should be adopted.128  However, 
like SSL/TLS for IP or bailiwick checking for DNS, filtering may 
thwart some eavesdroppers by allowing “only authorized peers to 
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draw traffic from their routers, and is only for specific IP 
prefixes.”129  Unfortunately, though, filtering can be inefficient and 
only effective if every ISP participates, underscoring another 
collective action problem potentially amenable to polycentric 
regulation.  A more systemic approach to addressing BGP 
vulnerabilities has been developed by Stephen Kent, chief scientist 
for information security at BBN Technologies, but the scheme 
would only authenticate the “first hop” in a BGP route.130 
IPsec and DNSSEC demonstrate that fixes to key Internet 
protocols are being developed, and adoption of endpoint-based 
solutions such as HTTPS and VPNs is increasing.  However, 
overall progress has been slow considering that many of these 
vulnerabilities were identified in the mid-1990s.  There is little 
consensus about which solutions are best and how to incentivize 
implementation.  For example, can security extensions to key 
protocols even be effective?  Are endpoint-based solutions 
preferable, and if so, how can we be sure that end users will adopt 
them?  Is there a role for law here, and what are the regulatory, 
economic, and political implications? 
The Internet’s architecture contributes to its insecurity, which 
presents complex challenges for stakeholders including engineers, 
governments, businesses, and users.  Every day, the Internet 
delivers DNS responses that are not reliably authenticated and 
sends unverified IP packets between hosts and through routers that 
are running on trust, which is sometimes misplaced.  For example, 
although bank ATMs, air traffic control systems, and electrical 
grids can run on private networks, many systems still send 
information via the public Internet, even if they are protected by 
VPNs and HTTPS, which can introduce new vulnerabilities.131  
Cyber peace requires addressing these technical vulnerabilities and 
incentivizing the adoption of solutions from the bottom-up once 
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scientific consensus is achieved, such as incentives to support the 
uptake of IPsec, DNSSEC, and IP packet filtering, as well as the 
creation of a National Science Foundation (NSF) grant competition 
to research alternatives to the BGP.132  The main barriers to doing 
so include the cost of implementing DNSSEC and IPsec, and 
uncertainty about whether these and other fixes are effective or 
will simply shift the locus of the problem.  This may be compared 
to the Montreal Protocol, which is an international environmental 
treaty designed to address the ozone hole in which the science 
linking CFCs to the ozone hole was clear and a relatively small 
subset of industry was affected, as opposed to the UNFCCC 
climate-change negotiations.133  As with the ozone hole, 
Kaminsky’s bug showed a common problem to which there was an 
available solution in the form of security patches and DNSSEC.  
The differences here lie in the greater number and diversity of 
stakeholders required to take action—making that aspect more 
similar to the UNFCCC process—as well as continuing scientific 
uncertainty.  Until these issues are overcome, targeted measures 
should be taken even if they do not solve all protocol 
vulnerabilities.  The extension of DNSSEC to the root and TLDs is 
an example of successful public-private polycentric governance in 
which the U.S. government, IETF, and private firms came together 
to address a common problem and in so doing, enhanced the public 
good of cybersecurity.  Such partnerships should be broadened and 
strengthened, but securing the logical infrastructure is just the 
second layer of vulnerability requiring attention.  Cyber peace also 
requires improving the code that uses these networking protocols. 
D. Debugging and Regulating Through Code 
Architectural vulnerabilities of the Internet lay the groundwork 
for explaining the cyber threat, but there is more to it than that.  If 
everything built on top of the Internet was secure or if all users 
behaved with perfect insight into cyber risks, the threats posed by 
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the Internet’s protocols might be contained.  Unfortunately, this is 
not the case.  Users rarely excel at security assessment.  Similarly, 
what is built on top of the Internet, including operating systems 
and applications, is far from ironclad.  This substantiates a third 
fundamental vulnerability; code. 
A programming error is but a recent incarnation of a 
vulnerability that is even older than Internet protocols.  It is an 
error in craftsmanship, like a poorly secured board that would 
never have been discovered but for a tornado.  In this case, 
however, the crafters of software are laying lines of code rather 
than framing a house, and hackers are the storm.  As has been 
described by Professor Lessig, “code is law,” but even though code 
has such a vital role to play in Internet governance, it is written and 
tested by fallible human beings who make errors, creating 
“bugs.”134  Back in 1949, Maurice Wilkes, a British computer 
scientist, wrote: 
As soon as we started programming, we found to 
our surprise that it wasn’t as easy to get programs 
right as we had thought. Debugging had to be 
discovered. I can remember the exact instant when I 
realized that a large part of my life from then on 
was going to be spent in finding mistakes in my 
own programs.135 
Debugging is not an easy process, mostly because programs 
often run adequately with bugs—just as a house does not often 
collapse because of a few loose nails.  Moreover, bugs are 
seemingly endless.  A popular programming song jokes: 
99 little bugs in the code, 
99 little bugs in the code, 
Fix one bug, compile it again, 
101 little bugs in the code.136 
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Code, then, is subject to human error as well as malicious 
intent because some programmers may purposefully insert bugs so 
that they can reenter the code later.  Either way, sophisticated 
hackers may also exploit these bugs.  And this problem may get 
worse before it gets better.  As programs grow increasingly 
complex, more lines of code are often used to get the job done.  
Microsoft’s Windows 95 had 10 million lines of code; Windows 
XP has approximately 40 million.137  More lines of code mean 
more opportunities to make mistakes and more targets to defend 
against attackers.  As was described by Clarke and Knake in Cyber 
War, “even experts cannot usually identify coding errors or 
intentional vulnerabilities in a few lines of code, let alone in 
millions.”138 
Targets abound because code underlies everything, meaning 
that attackers can shift their focus as some systems improve or 
others gain popularity.  For example, whereas operating system 
vulnerabilities are reportedly declining, application vulnerabilities 
are increasing.139  More hackers are also targeting Apple products 
as they gain market share.  In October 2010, Apple reported that 
there are approximately “5,000 ‘strains’ of malware that target the 
Mac and . . . that [some] 500 new Mac-specific samples [are] 
appearing every month.”140  In 2012, a single Trojan virus infected 
more than 550,000 Apple computers.141  In addition, because 
developers like Microsoft and Apple are often unaware of coding 
mistakes when they release new products, bugs can go 
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undiscovered for some time.142  This gives attackers time to find 
and exploit bugs and to damage strategically important targets. 
According to Professor Murray, leveraging control of the 
Internet’s physical infrastructure could lead the market to “route 
around this anomaly in the same way the network routes around 
damaged nodes.”143  Instead, he advocates for designing 
interventions to manage vulnerabilities in the logical 
infrastructure,144 which in turn shapes the regulatory environment 
of cyberspace.  Indeed, the reliance on basically “a single protocol” 
makes regulating through code an appealing proposition.145  For 
example, code design could be regulated to include enhanced 
privacy, data management,146 and cybersecurity.  But code-based 
cybersecurity solutions face at least two problems: (1) code-based 
controls would have to be leveraged into the carrier layer of the 
logical infrastructure, and (2) the carrier layer is founded on 
TCP/IP, which “was designed as an end-to-end protocol” lacking 
intelligence.147  In other words, code is only as secure as the 
underlying systems on which it is running, which as has been 
discussed are far from robust.  Nevertheless, this underscores the 
importance of standards-setting bodies “with the ability to leverage 
comprehensive code-based controls . . . [namely] technical 
‘consortia of interested persons and companies’”148 such as the 
IETF.  The question then becomes how best to encourage the 
uptake of cybersecurity best practices published by these bodies as 
consensus emerges while also addressing underlying 
vulnerabilities, which will be discussed. 
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Like the Internet protocols, programming flaws are spread 
throughout the system, permeating hardware and software and 
often bringing to light vulnerabilities at the application layer.  Yet 
the fourth and final major vulnerability discussed in this section—
social platforms—represents an even wider and more dispersed 
problem: you and me.  The phrase “social engineering” describes a 
method that takes advantage of the fact that, ultimately, it is 
humans who run software on hardware on networks, and it is we 
who are often considered to be the most insecure link in an 
insecure system. 
E.  The Threat of Social Engineering to the Content Layer 
Social engineering is merely one type of threat facing the 
content layer, but this variety of cyber attacks are increasingly 
popular and most often occurs when an attacker sends a user a 
malware-infected e-mail or message that is uniquely targeted to an 
individual or organization.149  It is merely an updated version of an 
age-old scam that manipulates people into divulging sensitive 
information, but those updates make it cutting edge.  Today, 
attackers often do their homework before attempting a scam.  They 
can search your cache to see which websites you have visited.  Or 
they might be able to access your Facebook, Twitter, or LinkedIn 
accounts where they can learn about your friends, interests, and 
professional networks to tailor attacks.150 
Social engineering began as “phishing” e-mails, which were 
sent out en masse, but early phishing e-mails were relatively easy 
to spot.  Most people knew not to click on a link in an e-mail 
purportedly from “Bank of America” when, for example, the red 
and blue flag image looked disjointed.  More recently, though, 
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phishing e-mails have become more sophisticated and 
successful.151  For example, “spear phishing” is becoming 
increasingly common, which involves sending targeted messages 
of the kind that even fooled Google employees in 2009 during 
what came to be known as Operation Aurora.152  “Whaling” 
messages are sent to the “big fish” of an organization (apologies to 
biological taxonomists).153  According to The Economist, “[t]he 
amount of information now available online about individuals 
makes it ever easier to attack a computer by crafting a personalized 
e-mail that is more likely to be trusted and opened.”154  In other 
words, if an attacker can learn that you are a 35-year-old male 
from Indiana who works at a pharmaceutical company, are friends 
with Tom, and likes science fiction, then it is far easier to craft a 
message that you would open.  And, typically, it is possible to get 
far more information than that through a public records search.  
Attached to either sort of message may be a link to a malicious 
website to open, or file to download.  Such messages will often 
purportedly be from someone you know or an organization with 
which you do business.  This tactic capitalizes on the inherent trust 
in your relationships.  And it works. 
A study conducted at Indiana University documents the 
usefulness of social media in social engineering.  As Professor 
Fred Cate, a distinguished professor at Indiana University Maurer 
School of Law and director of the Center for Applied 
Cybersecurity Research, wrote in comments submitted to the 
White House, “the percentage of recipients of a phishing message 
persuaded to provide their account name and password increased 
from 16 to 72 percent when researchers made it appear that the 
fraudulent message originated from a Facebook friend.”155  Such 
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an instance may create a spiraling problem, as many people reuse 
passwords for their social platforms, personal or work email, and 
bank accounts.  In fact, a study done by Internet security company 
Bitdefender in 2010 found that 75 percent of users had “one 
common password for social networking and accessing their 
email.”156  Additionally, because there is growing evidence of 
wrongdoers collaborating, one attacker’s Facebook profile hacking 
may be another’s ticket to committing crime or espionage.  
Imagine, for example, that you have been emailing your boss about 
where to open a new bank account, and an attacker inserts an 
account into the thread and tells you to transfer the money into it.  
Most often you would probably confirm the change with your 
boss, but if it is five o’clock on a Friday, you might just do it.  And 
you would not be alone.  A version of this sort of hack happened to 
Lockheed Martin employees.157  The U.S.-based defense contractor 
designs and builds sophisticated jet fighters for the U.S. military; 
the jets’ blueprints include more than 7.5 million lines of code and 
intricate hardware designs.158  Attackers after this information 
might once have spent significant time and resources attempting to 
crack encryption, and break down firewalls.  But instead, this time 
they tried social engineering, and it reportedly worked.  Emails 
purportedly sent by Chinese hackers were crafted to look like they 
were being sent from the Pentagon.  They requested blueprints for 
the F-35 Lightning Joint Strike Fighter, and Lockheed Martin 
employees obliged.159 
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At this point, you may be thinking it probably takes 
sophistication to conduct these sorts of attacks, and sophistication 
is rare.  True, but sophistication can go on sale.  In recent years, 
attackers have been able to buy kits that support social engineering 
attacks online.  According to one report, in the first six months of 
2007, forty-two percent of all phishing messages originated from 
three toolkits sold on the web.160  To some researchers, including 
those who investigated GhostNet, the widespread use of social 
engineering tactics and the availability of tools for executing such 
attacks are equally concerning and help explain the rise in 
cybercrime and espionage.161 
F. Summary 
This Part on physical, logical, and content vulnerabilities has 
demonstrated how every layer of cyberspace is insecure.  Because 
of IP, TCP, DNS, and BGP protocol vulnerabilities, the Internet 
itself is vulnerable.  Bugs in hardware and software make systems 
running on the Internet exploitable.  And humans who use the 
hardware and software can make a bad situation worse.  Even if all 
the bugs were fixed and protocols were secured, according to 
Johnny Long, co-author of No Tech Hacking, there is always going 
to be a human somewhere who “holds the keys to the kingdom” 
and may be scammed or bribed into giving them up.162  Cyber 
peace requires then not only technical innovation to counter the 
growing number of cyber weapons and their proliferation, but also 
education and better management practices to help mitigate insider 
threats.  Although technical fixes in the form of IPsec, DNSSEC, 
and anti-social engineering campaigns are not panacea cures for 
these vulnerabilities, they do represent targeted measures 
developed by consortia that can be implemented from the bottom-
up.  We now turn to discussing how this may be conceptualized 
within a polycentric framework. 
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III. UNDERSTANDING THE CYBER THREAT ECOSYSTEM WITHIN A 
POLYCENTRIC FRAMEWORK 
This final Part begins by discussing some of the cyber threats 
that are taking advantage of the technical vulnerabilities discussed 
in Part II, before pivoting to analyze how they may be better 
addressed through the application of polycentric principles. 
A. From the Foothills of the Himalayas to the Frontiers of 
Cyberspace: Introducing the Cyber Threat Ecosystem 
Botnets and other cyber weapons are readily accessible as 
online toolkits and are relatively inexpensive.  Coupled with the 
facts that the Internet is global, access is widespread, and the 
benefits to attackers are concentrated while costs are diffused, a 
worrying scenario unfolds.  As Scott Charney, Microsoft’s vice 
president for trustworthy computing, wrote of the cyber threat in 
2009, “[t]here are many malicious actors [including criminals, 
terrorists, and states] . . . .  Indeed, the Internet is a great place to 
commit crime because it provides global connectivity, anonymity, 
lack of traceability, and rich targets.”163  According to a 2009 
Trend Micro report, cybercrime kits are now widely available 
online, and they are getting cheaper.164  Prices can range from a 
few cents up to hundreds of dollars or more for sophisticated 
malware.165  According to a 2005 Symantec study, $300 will rent a 
150,000-strong botnet.166  Some reports have found that it is even 
possible to sign up for a free three-minute botnet trial,167 while 
Zeus, the prolific trojan horse previously mentioned, can be 
                                                                                                             
163 SCOTT CHARNEY, MICROSOFT, RETHINKING THE CYBER THREAT: A FRAMEWORK AND 
PATH FORWARD 5 (2009). 
164 See Tracking Ghostnet, supra note 131, at 47; Threat Reports, TREND MICRO, 
https://imperia.trendmicro-europe.com/us/trendwatch/research-and-analysis/threat-reports 
(last visited Dec. 16, 2012). 
165 See MICHAEL CROSS & DEBRA LITTLEJOHN SHINDER, SCENE OF A CYBERCRIME 499 
(2008); Byron Acohido, DIY Cybercrime Kits Power Growth in Net Phishing Attacks, 
USA TODAY (Jan. 18, 2010, 2:47 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/
industries/technology/2010-01-17-internet-scams-phishing_n.htm. 
166 See VII SYMANTEC, INTERNET SECURITY THREAT REPORT 63 (2005). 
167 See Gunter Ollman, Want to Rent an 80–120k DDoS Botnet?, DAY BEFORE ZERO, 
http:blog.damballa.com?p330 (last visited June 16, 2013). 
418 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 24:381 
 
purchased for as little as $700.168  And it can be freely traded.169  
GhostNet researchers report that “[t]oday, pirated cyber-crime kits 
circulate extensively on the Internet and can be downloaded by 
anyone about as easily as the latest pirated DVD.”170  Whereas 
Miller says that he needs about $50 million to hack the planet, 
according to Haroon Meer, a cybersecurity specialist at Thinkst, 
one could put together a team that could break in just about 
anywhere, that is, win a battle, if not a war, for a fraction of that 
cost.171  This is according to informal surveys conducted by Meer 
with his fellow cybersecurity specialists, who self-report a high 
success rate at breaking into targeted systems.  A total cost of less 
than $500,000 to break into nearly any system worries Meer; “It’s 
a scary number. That wouldn’t even pay for the annual anti-virus 
subscription of a big multinational company.”172 
An explosion in both the white and black markets has led to the 
increased availability of cyber weapons.  For example, software 
that allows remote access to or control of a Blackberry is being 
sold commercially.173  Similarly, a company that made and sold 
spyware had to be taken to court before they would take it off the 
market.174  Lines can be difficult to draw since spyware enables 
users to send infected attachments, but it can also allow parents to 
monitor their children’s web activities.175  In addition, according to 
Lewis of CSIS, the turnaround time on exploitative tools from the 
NSA to the black market is not long—perhaps “three to eight 
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years”—although the evidence relied upon in making this estimate 
is “partial and anecdotal.”176 
Whether available on the white or black markets, cyber 
weapons have evolved quickly to attack social networking 
platforms and mobile devices.177  According to one 2011 report, 
“[t]he pace of change in this technology is quite dramatic.  Only a 
few years ago, malware for smartphones and cellular devices was 
unheard of.”178  By 2010, however, it was relatively 
commonplace.179  In November 2010 alone, for example, a virus 
that stole contact information to commit fraud had reportedly hit 
more than one million mobile phones in China.180  Such attacks are 
concerning not only because they are becoming easier to launch, 
but also because they point to criminal organizations getting 
involved.  As Scott Charney noted, a variety of actors are taking 
advantage of these weapons.181  With the help of vulnerable 
Internet platforms like mobile phones, according to National White 
Collar Crime Center director Donald Brackman, “Internet crime is 
evolving in ways we couldn’t have imagined just five years 
ago.”182  Monetary interests alone may not be driving this 
evolution.  Rather, state-sponsored attacks may be partly to blame 
because states can combine a hacker’s tricks with “the intelligence 
apparatus to reconnoiter a target, the computing power to break 
codes and passwords, and the patience to probe a system until it 
finds a weakness—usually a fallible human being.”183  Entities 
within the private sector are taking note.  Google, for example, has 
                                                                                                             
176 Lewis, supra note 16, at 9. 
177 See generally DUNHAM, supra note 173 (exploring many of the myriad 
vulnerabilities prevalent on mobile devices). 
178 From the Eye of the Storm, supra note 139. 
179 See MCAFEE LABS, MCAFEE THREATS REPORT: THIRD QUARTER 2010, 15–16, 
available at http://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/reports/rp-quarterly-threat-q3-2010.
pdf. 
180 See Warwick Ashford, Over a Million Mobile Phones Hit by Virus in China, 
COMPUTERWEEKLY (Nov. 12, 2010, 5:00 PM), http:www.computerweekly.com
Articles20101112243921Over-a-million-mobile-phones-hit-by-virus-in-China.htm. 
181 See Charney, supra note 163, at 5. 
182 Mary Jean Babic, The Evolution of Cyber Crime, U. MICH. LSA MAG., Spring 2011, 
at 29, available at http://issuu.com/lsamagazine/docs/11spr-entiremag/1. 
183 Cyberwar, supra note 17. 
420 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 24:381 
 
begun posting warnings if its security team believes that a state-
sponsored attack could compromise users’ accounts.184  The 
involvement of states in sponsoring cyber attacks is also altering 
the nature of cyber conflict—just as the growing involvement of 
states in Internet governance is impacting its trajectory.185  
Consider the following example, which contextualizes the use of 
social engineering and the emergence of espionage networks. 
The attack was first traced from northern India, where Tibet’s 
spiritual leader resides. “[T]he private office of the Dalai Lama” 
had been targeted and sensitive documentation extracted, 
according to GhostNet investigator Greg Walton.186  However, 
from that starting point, the investigation expanded.  Between 2007 
and 2009, Walton and others at the Information Warfare Monitor 
(IWM) discovered that more than 1,295 computers “located at 
ministries of foreign affairs, embassies, international organizations, 
news media offices, and NGOs” in 103 countries had been 
compromised.187  The resulting report found that roughly seventy 
percent of the control servers implicated in the attacks were located 
at IP addresses that resolved to China.188  In April 2010, IWM 
released a follow-up report entitled Shadows in the Cloud, which 
analyzed data systematically stolen from governments, businesses, 
academia, and computer networks in the United Nations, India, the 
United States, “and several other countries.”189  Investigators of the 
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so-called Shadow network were able to view documents that cyber 
attackers had exfiltrated.  Whereas the command and control 
structure of Shadow was arguably more intricate than that of 
GhostNet, investigators found that all of the core servers that 
appeared to be at the center of the network were hosted on domain 
names in China.190  Ultimately however, the IWM team wrote: 
“Although we are able to piece together circumstantial evidence 
that provides the location and possible associations of the 
attackers, their actual identities and locations remain illusory.  We 
[only] catch a glimpse of a shadow of attribution in the 
cloud . . . .”191 
As is demonstrated by the Shadow example, attribution is 
difficult because attackers can mask their identities, dispersing 
themselves across platforms and jurisdictions.192  This may be 
done because of at least three reasons: the first is conceptual, the 
second is technical, and the third is legal.  Conceptually, attribution 
means different things to different people.  To some, it might just 
mean identifying an IP address; to others, a state or an 
organization; and to others, a human being with a motive.193  
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Technically, sophisticated attacks by knowledgeable hackers, 
whether private or state sponsored, are difficult to trace definitively 
to their source.194  The science of tracing cyber attacks has been 
somewhat slow to develop in part because of TCP/IP.195  If an IP 
packet can be grabbed or spoofed mid-route, it becomes difficult to 
trace it back to where it actually began.  Thus, whereas in theory it 
is possible to locate the IP address of cyber attackers and use that 
information to identify individual hackers, sophisticated attackers 
are able to re-route or otherwise confuse programs designed to 
locate them.  Similarly, if a hacker is using a botnet to carry out 
attacks, the process of tracing IP packets becomes much more 
involved and time consuming.  Can the cyber infrastructure be 
modernized to enhance tracing?  The short answer is yes, but not 
easily or cheaply.  Overhauling protocols once they are 
implemented is no simple matter.  Some, like Admiral McConnell, 
remain adamant that “we need to reengineer the Internet to make 
attribution, geolocation, intelligence analysis, and impact 
assessment . . . more manageable.”196  However, this is unlikely—
at least in the short term—and many people are not convinced that 
the architecture should be overhauled because it would mean 
limiting anonymity online.197  Compromise may take the form of 
encouraging the use of VPNs and focusing on improving security 
for certain cyber transactions such as those involving critical 
national infrastructure, which could be made more traceable 
without ending anonymity as we know it. 
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B. Toward a Polycentric Approach to Mitigating Technical 
Vulnerabilities 
To substantiate discussions of cyber weapons and 
vulnerabilities at multiple levels and explore some of the 
difficulties inherent in achieving cyber peace, this Part began by 
discussing the Shadow cyber espionage campaign.  This 
demonstrates how cyber attacks are evolving and suggest that there 
are now many malicious actors in cyberspace—including states.  
Indeed, since the early 2000s, states have become more interested 
in the Internet in terms of governance, as a tool for espionage,198 
and as a way to control restive populations.  “These days even the 
website of China’s Defense Ministry has a section with music 
downloads . . . ,” noted Evgeny Morozov.199  However, while 
states are an important aspect of the evolving cyber threat, cyber 
attacks, like most kinds of threats, are the result of a more complex 
ecosystem.  Protocols, programming, and people all contribute to 
its structure and give form to its vulnerabilities.  And as cyberspace 
expands, these problems may get worse before they get better.  
Every day our digital lives are enhanced, but each new program, 
app, or cloud computing service also “creates an opportunity for 
this ecosystem to morph, adapt, and exploit” because “these new 
technologies [develop] faster than procedures and rules have been 
created to deal with the . . . vulnerabilities they introduce.”200  
Because of the manner in which Internet governance has evolved, 
no single entity has a mandate to enhance security in the system, 
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and perhaps that is how it should be since if a single entity did 
occupy the field, such as the U.S. government or an 
intergovernmental organization, it could risk crowding out 
innovative bottom-up efforts.201 
This Article has shown that vulnerabilities exist at the physical, 
logical, and content layers of the Internet’s architecture, and that an 
array of cyber weapons are being deployed by attackers with 
varying motives to take advantage of these vulnerabilities.  
Whether it is problems in IP or DNS, these vulnerabilities are best 
managed from the bottom-up through education, market-based 
incentives, and, if necessary, regulatory intervention.  Such efforts 
will benefit from coordination among dispersed power holders; for 
example, the extension of DNSSEC to the root and TLDs is an 
example of a successful polycentric measure that has improved on 
the status quo, even if it has not fully resolved the underlying 
problem.  Lessons should be taken from protocols, which must fill 
a real need, be incrementally deployable, and enjoy open source 
availability to be successful.202 
In short, instead of waiting for scientific and political 
consensus for how best to comprehensively solve the cyber threat, 
action should be taken through nested enterprises at multiple levels 
taking into account the layering of the Internet’s infrastructure and 
Professor Ostrom’s design principles.203  This effort may be 
conceptualized as a polycentric undertaking given that it 
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“encourages experimentation at multiple levels,”204 self-regulation 
and bottom-up governance, as well as targeted measures to address 
global collective action problems.  For example, empowering 
communities with defined boundaries of responsibility and 
authority recognized by state actors is one component of mitigating 
technical vulnerabilities under the “collective-choice arrangements 
and minimal recognition of rights” principle.205  However, because 
of the limits of regulating exclusively through code and the risk of 
regulatory competition,206 as well as the multifaceted nature of 
cyber attacks extending beyond technical vulnerabilities, laws, 
norms, and markets also have a key role to play in shaping the 
regulatory environment and fostering cyber peace.  The way 
forward, then, involves taking incremental steps to address the 
multiple layers and dimensions of this threat ecosystem, focusing 
first on the physical and logical infrastructures given that these 
layers comprise the foundation of cybersecurity.  Potential 
solutions to TCP, IP, DNS, and BGP vulnerabilities such as IPsec, 
DNSSEC, and IP packet filtering should be further refined and, 
after achieving broader consensus, widely implemented; hardware 
and software must be improved, such as through securing supply 
chains or creating liability structures; and users must be 
incentivized to become better educated and responsible.  Even 
though managing technical vulnerabilities is just the first step in 
the journey to enhancing global cybersecurity, it is a vital one that 
deserves more attention by public- and private-sector regulators 
seeking out best practices generated organically from the bottom-
up and codifying them where necessary to help ensure that 
fictional accounts such as Miller’s cyber army do not join the ranks 
of real life exploits such as Shadow and the Syrian Electronic 
Army’s attacks.  Technical communities have a central role to play 
in shaping this debate as part of a polycentric approach to 
mitigating cyber attacks and promoting cyber peace. 
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